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Summary. We study the Mas-Colell bargaining set of an exchange economy
with differential information and a continuum of traders. We established the
equivalence of the private bargaining set and the set of Radner competitive equi-
librium allocations. As for the weak fine bargaining set, we show that it contains
the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated symmetric in-
formation economy in which each trader has the “joint information” of all the
traders in the original economy, but unlike the weak fine core and the set of fine
value allocations, it may also contain allocations which are not competitive in
the associated economy.
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1 Introduction
There is a large literature studying the cooperative foundations of competitive
equilibria. In this literature the core is introduced as a solution concept that, with-
out appealing to an specific institutional framework, identifies the allocations that
may result from a multilateral bargaining situation in which traders discuss alter-
native mutually beneficial trades. A difficulty of the core as a solution concept is
that when a coalition threats to break an agreement it does not take into account
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how other coalitions may react to this threat; i.e., coalitional objections to a pro-
posed allocation are not required to be robust to possible counterobjections. To
address this issue, Aumann and Maschler (1964) introduce the notion of bargain-
ing set for cooperative games with finitely many players. In the definition of the
bargaining set, coalitional objections to a proposed agrement that admit coun-
terobjections are disregarded; that is, when demanding improvements, coalitions
must take account of the reactions of other coalitions–for a discussion of this
issue (see Maschler, 1976, 1992). Mas-Colell (1989) introduces a new notion of
bargaining set and shows that in a complete information exchange economy with
a continuum of traders it coincides with the set of competitive allocations. [The
equivalence of the core, the set of value allocations and the set of competitive
equilibrium allocations in this context was established by Aumann (1964, 1975).]
Radner (1968, 1982) introduces a model of exchange economy with differ-
ential information in which every trader is characterized by a state dependent
utility function, a random initial endowment, an information partition, and a
prior belief. In this framework, traders arrange contingent contracts for trading
commodities before they obtain any information about the realized state of na-
ture. Radner (1968) extends the notion of Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium
to this model. In the definition of competitive equilibrium (in the sense of Rad-
ner), the information of an agent places a restriction on his feasible trades (i.e.,
his budget set): better information allows for more contingent trades (i.e., en-
larges the agent’s budget set). Thus, a Radner competitive equilibrium rewards
the information advantage of a trader.
In this paper we study the relation of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the
set of competitive allocations of an economy with differential information and
a continuum of traders. Our aim is not only to determine whether there are
equivalence results similar to those found for complete information economies,
but also to explore whether the bargaining set discriminates between traders with
differential information.
In the context of exchange economies with differential information and
finitely many traders, Yannelis (1991) introduces the concept of private core,
and proves that it is non-empty. Krasa and Yannelis (1994) introduce the no-
tion of private value allocation, and discuss examples where the private value
rewards the information advantage of a trader. In this approach, the traders of
a coalition use only their private information (i.e., there is no information ex-
change). Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1998) show that in a Radner type economy
with a continuum of traders the private core coincides with the set of Radner
competitive equilibrium allocations, and Einy and Shitovitz (1998) establish the
analogous result for the set of private value allocations. Thus, as pointed out by
Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993) and Krasa and Yannelis (1994), the private
core and private value reward the information advantage of a trader.
Our findings in the present paper confirm these results: we introduce the
notion of Mas-Colell private bargaining set, and we show that in a Radner type
economy with a continuum of traders this set coincides with the set of Radner
competitive allocations. Our proof that the Mas-Colell private bargaining set
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coincides with the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations is along
the lines of the proof of Mas-Colell (1989), although the details of some of the
arguments require more involved constructions because we must deal with the
measurability restrictions imposed by the traders differential information, and
also with the possibility that competitive prices may not be strictly positive.
An interesting question is whether the information advantage of a trader is
rewarded when we account for the possibility that traders in a coalition may com-
municate and share some of their information. These possibilities are captured by
the notion of fine core due to Wilson (1978). Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1998)
show that the set of (weak) fine core allocations of a Radner type economy with
a continuum of traders coincides with set of competitive equilibrium allocations
of an associated symmetric information economy in which each trader has the
“joint information” of all the traders in the original economy. Einy, Moreno and
Shitovitz (1999) establish an analogous result for fine value allocations.
These results suggest that when the possibility of sharing information is in-
troduced the information advantage of a trader is worthless. Interestingly, this is
not the case when we use the weak fine bargaining set as the solution concept:
we find that in a Radner type economy with a continuum of traders the weak
fine bargaining set contains the competitive allocations of the associated sym-
metric information economy, albeit it may also contain other allocations where
the traders with an information advantage are more favorably treated. Thus, in
contrast with the weak fine core and the set of weak fine value allocations, the
weak fine bargaining set may reward the information advantage of a trader.
2 The model
We consider a Radner-type exchange economy E with differential information
(e.g., Radner (1968, 1982)).
The space of traders is a measure space (T , Σ, µ), where T is a set (the set
of traders), Σ is a σ-field of subsets of T (the set of coalitions), and µ is a
non-atomic measure on Σ. The commodity space is l+. The space of states of
nature is a finite set Ω. The economy extends over two time periods, τ = 0, 1.
Consumption takes place at τ = 1. At τ = 0 there is uncertainty over the state
of nature; in this period traders arrange contracts that may be contingent on the
realized state of nature at τ = 1. At τ = 1 traders do not necessarily know
which state of nature ω ∈ Ω actually occurred, although they know their own
endowments, and may also have some additional information about the state of
nature. We do not assume, however, that traders know their own utility function.
The information of a trader t ∈ T is described by a partition Πt of Ω.
We denote by Ft the field generated by Πt . If ω0 is the true state of nature,
at τ = 1 trader t observes the member of Πt which contains ω0. Every trader
t ∈ T has a probability distribution qt on Ω which represents his prior beliefs.
The preferences of a trader t ∈ T are represented by a state dependent utility
function, ut : Ω × l+ →  such that for every (t , x ) ∈ Ω × l+, the mapping
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(t , x ) → ut (ω, x ) is Σ ×B measurable, where ω is a fixed member of Ω, and
B is the σ-field of Borel subsets of l+. If x is a random bundle (i.e., a function
from Ω to l+) we denote by ht (x ) the expected utility of trader t ∈ T from x .
That is
ht (x ) =
∑
ω∈Ω
qt (ω)ut (ω, x (ω)).
An assignment is a function x : T ×Ω → l+ such that for every ω ∈ Ω the
function x(·, ω) is µ-integrable on T . There is a fixed initial assignment e; e(t , ω)
represents the initial endowment of trader t ∈ T in the state of nature ω ∈ Ω.
We assume that e(t , ω) is in l++ for every (t , ω) ∈ T ×Ω, and for every t ∈ T
the function e(t , ·) is Ft -measurable.
In the rest of the paper, an economy E is an atomless economy with differ-
ential information as described above. Also we use the following notation: For
two vectors x = (x1, . . . , xl ) and y = (y1, . . . , yl ) in l we write x ≥ y when
xk ≥ yk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ l , x > y when x ≥ y and x /= y , and x  y when
xk > yk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ l .
Let E be an economy. A private allocation is an assignment x such that
(2.1) for almost all t ∈ T the function x(t , ·) is Ft -measurable, and
(2.2) ∫T x(t , ω)dµ ≤ ∫T e(t , ω)dµ for all ω ∈ Ω.
A price system is a non-zero function p : Ω → l+. Let t ∈ T . Write Mt for the
set of all Ft -measurable functions from Ω to l+. For a price system p, define
the budget set of t by
B (p, t) =
{
x | x ∈ Mt and
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · x (ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · e(t , ω)
}
.
A competitive equilibrium (in the sense of Radner) is a pair (p, x) where p is a
price system and x is private allocation such that
(2.3) for almost all t ∈ T the function x(t , ·) maximizes ht on B (p, t), and
(2.4) ∑ω∈Ω p(ω) · ∫T x(t , ω)dµ = ∑ω∈Ω p(ω) · ∫T e(t , ω)dµ.
A competitive allocation is a private allocation x for which there exists a price
system p such that (p, x) is a competitive equilibrium.
Note that since Ω is a finite set there is a finite family {Πi}ni=1 of partitions
of Ω such that for all t ∈ T there is 1 ≤ i ≤ n with Πt = Πi . We assume that
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the set Ti = {t ∈ T | Πt = Πi} is measurable, and µ(Ti ) > 0.
For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we denote by Fi the field generated by Πi .
Throughout the paper we assume that for all t ∈ T and ω ∈ Ω the function
ut (ω, ·) is strictly increasing and continuous on l+. (A function u : l+ →  is
strictly increasing if for all x , y ∈ l+, x > y implies u(x ) > u(y). )
Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1998) have shown that if the utility functions
of the traders are continuous and strictly increasing, and if every commodity is
present in the market (i.e., ∫T e(t , ω)dµ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω), then a competitive
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equilibrium (in the sense of Radner) exists when the economy is irreducible
(see Theorem A in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz, 1998). Since in our model the
initial endowments of the traders are in l++, the economies we consider here
are irreducible (see Proposition 3.1 in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz, 1998), and
therefore always have a competitive equilibrium.
3 The private bargaining set
In this section we introduce the notion of (Mas-Colell) private bargaining set,
and show that it coincides with the set of (Radner) competitive allocations. We
begin by extending to our model the definition of private core due to Yannelis
(1991).
Let E be an economy, and let x be a private allocation. A private objection
to x is a pair (S , y) such that
(3.1) µ(S ) > 0,
(3.2) y(t , ·) is Ft -measurable for almost all t ∈ S ,
(3.3) ∫S y(t , ω)dµ ≤ ∫S e(t , ω) for all ω ∈ Ω,
(3.4) ht (y(t , ·)) ≥ ht (x(t , ·)) for almost all t ∈ S , and
(3.5) µ({t ∈ S | ht (y(t , ·)) > ht (x(t , ·))}) > 0.
An assignment x is a private core allocation of E if it has no private objection.
The private core of E is the set of all private core allocations of E .
In defining the core, usually the inequalities (3.4) are strict, and (3.5) is
omitted. Since in our framework the utility functions of the traders are continuous
and strictly increasing in every state of nature, these alternative definitions of the
core are equivalent.
Let E be an economy, let x be a private allocation and let (S , y) be a private
objection to x. A private counterobjection to (S , y) is a pair (Q , z) such that
(3.6) µ(Q) > 0,
(3.7) z(t , ·) is Ft -measurable for almost all t ∈ Q ,
(3.8) ∫Q z(t , ω)dµ ≤ ∫Q e(t , ω) for all ω ∈ Ω,
(3.9) ht (z(t , ·)) > ht (y(t , ·)) for almost all t ∈ Q ∩ S , and
(3.10) ht (z(t , ·)) > ht (x(t , ·)) for almost all t ∈ Q\S .
A private objection to x, (S , y), is justified if it has no private counterobjection.
The (Mas-Colell) private bargaining set is the set of private allocations which
have no justified private objection. Note that the private core of an economy E
is a subset of the private bargaining set of E .
Theorem A. The private bargaining set of an economy E coincides with the set
of Radner competitive allocations of E .
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Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1998) have established that the set of Radner
competitive equilibrium allocations of an economy E as defined here coincides
with the private core of E . Since the private core is a subset of the private
bargaining set, in order to prove Theorem A it suffices to show that every private
bargaining set allocation of E is a competitive allocation of E . Our proof of
this result is along the lines of the proof of Theorem 1 in Mas-Colell (1989),
although the details of some of the arguments require more involved constructions
because we must deal with the measurability restrictions imposed by the traders
differential information, and also with the possibility that competitive prices may
not be strictly positive. (In spite of the fact that traders utility functions are strictly
increasing, in an economy with differential information we cannot guarantee that
competitive prices are strictly positive.) In establishing this result, the notion of
competitive objection will be useful.
A private objection (S , y) to x is a competitive objection if there is a price
system p such that for almost all t ∈ T
(3.11) if t ∈ S and z ∈ Mt satisfies ht (z ) ≥ ht (y(t , ·)), then
∑
ω∈Ω p(ω) · z (ω) ≥∑
ω∈Ω p(ω) · e(t , ω), and
(3.12) if t ∈ T\S and z ∈ Mt satisfies ht (z ) ≥ ht (x(t , ·)), then∑
ω∈Ω p(ω) · z (ω) ≥
∑
ω∈Ω p(ω) · e(t , ω).
Theorem A is a consequence of the following two lemmata.
Lemma 3.1. Every competitive objection (S , y) to a private allocation x is
justified.
Proof. Let (S , y) be competitive objection to an allocation x, and let p be the
price system associated with (S , y). Assume contrary to our claim that there is a
private counterobjection (Q , z) to (S , y). Then ht (z(t , ·)) > ht (y(t , ·)) for almost
all t ∈ Q ∩ S , and ht (z(t , ·)) > ht (x(t , ·)) for almost all t ∈ Q\S . Since for all
t ∈ T and all ω ∈ Ω, ut (ω, ·) is strictly increasing and e(t , ω)  0, and since
(S , y) is a competitive objection, for almost all t ∈ Q we have∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · z(t , ω) >
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · e(t , ω).
This contradicts that for all ω ∈ Ω, ∫Q z(t , ω)dµ ≤ ∫Q e(t , ω)dµ. 
Lemma 3.2. If x is not a competitive allocation, then there is a competitive ob-
jection to x.
Proof. Throughout the proof we assume without loss of generality that µ(T ) =
1. Assume that x is not a competitive allocation. We construct a competitive
objection to x. Define
P =
n⋂
i=1

p ∈ (l+)Ω |
∑
ω∈Ω
l∑
j =1
pj (ω) = 1 and
∑
ω∈A
p(ω)  0, for all A ∈ Πi

 .
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Then P is a non-empty convex subset of (l+)Ω . Now for p ∈ P and t ∈ T , the
budget set B (p, t) is a compact subset of Mt . Therefore the function ht attains a
maximum on B (p, t). For all p ∈ P and all t ∈ T let
D(p, t) = {x ∈ Mt | x maximizes ht on B (p, t)} ,
and
F (p, t) =


D(p, t) if ht (D(p, t)) > ht (x(t , ·))
D(p, t) ∪ {e(t , ·)} if ht (D(p, t)) = ht (x(t , ·))
{e(t , ·)} if ht (D(p, t)) < ht (x(t , ·)).
Let
α = 1 +
∑
ω∈Ω
l∑
j =1
∫
T
ej (t , ω)dµ,
and let
K =

x ∈ (l+)Ω |
∑
ω∈Ω
l∑
j =1
xj (ω) ≤ α

 ,
and
ˆK =

x ∈ K |
∑
ω∈Ω
l∑
j =1
xj (ω) = α

 .
Note that K is a non-empty compact convex subset of (l+)Ω . Write ¯P for the
closure of P , and define a correspondence φ : ¯P × T  2K by
φ(p, t) =


F (p, t) ∩ K if p ∈ P and D(p, t) ∩ K /= ∅
ˆK ∩ {λd | d ∈ F (p, t), λ ≥ 0} if p ∈ P and D(p, t) ∩ K = ∅
B (p, t) ∩ ˆK if p ∈ ¯P\P .
For every p ∈ ¯P define
ψ(p) =
∫
T
φ(p, t)dµ−
∫
T
e(t , ·)dµ.
Then for every p ∈ ¯P , ψ(p) is a non-empty convex subset of the compact convex
set K . The proof that ψ is also upper semicontinuous on ¯P is standard. From
the definition of ψ it is clear that for all p ∈ ¯P we have p · ψ(p) ≤ 0. Therefore
by (1) in Section 5.6 of Debreu (1959), there exists p∗ ∈ ¯P and z ∗ ∈ ψ(p∗)
such that z∗ ≤ 0. We show that p∗ /∈ ¯P\P . Suppose p∗ ∈ ¯P\P ; then z∗ ∈
(∫T (B (p∗, t) ∩ ˆK )dµ− ∫T e(t , ·)dµ). Therefore
∑
ω∈Ω
l∑
j =1
z ∗j (ω) = α−
∑
ω∈Ω
l∑
j =1
∫
T
ej (t , ω)dµ = 1,
which contradicts z ∗ ≤ 0. Thus p∗ /∈ ¯P\P . As z∗ ≤ 0, we have
z∗ ∈
∫
T
(F (p∗, t) ∩ K )dµ−
∫
T
e(t , ·)dµ.
7
Hence there exists an integrable function f on T such that f (t) ∈ F (p∗, t) for all
t ∈ T and z ∗ = ∫T f (t)dµ− ∫T e(t , ·)dµ. Write
S = {t ∈ T | f (t) ∈ D(p∗, t)},
and
C (p∗) = {t ∈ T | ht (D(p∗, t)) > ht (x(t , ·))}.
Since x is not a competitive allocation, we have µ(C (p∗)) > 0. As C (p∗) ⊂ S ,
µ(S ) > 0.
Now for all (t , ω) ∈ T ×Ω let
y(t , ω) = (f (t))(ω).
We show that (S , y) is a competitive objection to x. As noted above, µ(S ) > 0.
Since z∗ ≤ 0 and f (t) = e(t , ·) for t ∈ T\S , we have∫
S
y(t , ω)dµ ≤
∫
S
e(t , ω)dµ,
for all ω ∈ Ω. By the definition of y we have ht (y(t , ·)) ≥ ht (x(t , ·)) for all
t ∈ S , and ht (y(t , ·)) > ht (x(t , ·)) for all t ∈ C (p∗). If t ∈ S and z ∈ Mt satisfies
ht (z ) ≥ ht (y(t , ·)), then ht (D(p∗, t)) ≤ ht (z ). Therefore∑
ω∈Ω
p∗(ω) · z (ω) ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
p∗(ω) · e(t , ω).
Let t ∈ T\S . Then ht (D(p∗, t)) ≤ ht (x(t , ·)). Therefore if z ∈ Mt satisfies
ht (z ) ≥ ht (x(t , ·)), then ht (z ) ≥ ht (D(p∗, t)), and thus∑
ω∈Ω
p∗(ω) · z (ω) ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
p∗(ω) · e(t , ω).
This completes the proof that (S , y) is a competitive objection to x. 
4 The weak fine bargaining set
In this section we introduce the notion of weak fine bargaining set and study its
relation with the set of competitive allocations.
Let E be an economy, and let S ∈ Σ. Define
I (S ) = {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n and µ(S ∩ Ti ) > 0} .
where n and Ti are defined in Section 2. A weak fine allocation is an assignment
x such that
(4.1) For all t ∈ T , x(t , ·) is ∨ni=1Fi -measurable, and
(4.2) ∫T x(t , ω)dµ ≤ ∫S e(t , ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
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Let x be a weak fine allocation. A weak fine objection to x is a pair (S , y) such
that
(4.3) µ(S ) > 0,
(4.4) y(t , ·) is ∨i∈I (S )Fi -measurable for all t ∈ S ,
(4.5) ∫S y(t , ω)dµ ≤ ∫S e(t , ω) for all ω ∈ Ω,
(4.6) ht (y(t , ·)) ≥ ht (x(t , ·)) for almost all t ∈ S , and
(4.7) µ({t ∈ S | ht (y(t , ·)) > ht (x(t , ·))}) > 0.
A weak fine core allocation of E is a weak fine allocation x which has no weak
fine objection. The weak fine core of E is the set of all weak fine core allocations
of E .
The weak fine core was introduced in Yannelis (1991), Allen (1991), and
Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993). In order to define the weak fine bargaining
set we need to introduce the definition of weak fine counterobjection.
Let E be an economy, let x be a weak fine allocation, and let (S , y) be a
weak fine objection to x. A weak fine counterobjection to (S , y) is a pair (Q , z)
such that
(4.8) µ(Q) > 0,
(4.9) z(t , ·) is ∨i∈I (Q)Fi -measurable for almost all t ∈ Q ,
(4.10) ∫Q z(t , ω)dµ ≤ ∫Q e(t , ω) for all ω ∈ Ω,
(4.11) ht (z(t , ·)) > ht (y(t , ·)) for almost all t ∈ Q ∩ S , and
(4.12) ht (z(t , ·)) > ht (x(t , ·)) for almost all t ∈ Q\S .
A weak fine objection (S , y) to a weak fine allocation x is justified if it has not
weak fine counterobjection. The (Mas-Colell) weak fine bargaining set is the set
of weak fine allocations which have no justified weak fine objection.
Let E be an economy. Denote by E ∗ the economy obtained from E by
giving to each trader in E the joint information of all the traders in E , i.e., for
all t ∈ T , F ∗t =
∨n
i=1Fi , and leaving the rest of his characteristics unchanged.
Note that in E ∗ all traders have the same information (i.e., E ∗ is an economy
with symmetric information). For each t ∈ T , we denote by M ∗t the set of all
F ∗t -measurable functions from Ω to l+. Let p : Ω → l+ be a price system. In
the economy E ∗ the budget set of t ∈ T with respect to p is
B∗(p, t) =
{
x | x ∈ M ∗t ,
∑
ω∈G
p(ω) · x (ω) ≤
∑
ω∈G
p(ω) · e(t , ω)
}
.
A competitive equilibrium of E ∗ (in the sense of Radner) is now defined as in
Section 2.
Proposition 4.1. Every competitive allocation ofE ∗ is in the weak fine bargaining
set of E .
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Proof. It is easy to see that an economy E as defined in Section 2 satisfies
the assumptions of Theorem C in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1998), which
establishes that the set of competitive allocations of E ∗ coincides with the weak
fine core of E . Since the weak fine core is a subset of the weak fine bargaining
set, Proposition 4.1 readily follows from this result. 
As the following example shows, the analog of Theorem C in Einy, Moreno
and Shitovitz (1998) for the weak fine bargaining set does not hold: there are
allocations in the weak fine bargaining set that are not competitive allocations of
E ∗. For the analysis of the example we need some notation and a lemma which
is interesting on its own.
If E is an economy and S is a coalition with µ(S ) > 0, we denote by ES the
restriction of E to S ; that is, ES is an economy for which the space of traders
is (S , ΣS , µS ), where ΣS = {Q | Q ∈ Σ, Q ⊂ S}, and µS is the restriction of µ
to ΣS .
Lemma 4.2. Let E be an economy. Assume that (S , y) is a justified weak fine
objection to a weak fine allocation x in E . Then the restriction of y to S ×Ω is
a competitive allocation of E ∗S .
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that the restriction yˆ of y to S ×Ω is not
competitive in E ∗S . Then by Theorem C of Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1998), yˆ
is not in the weak fine core of ES . Therefore yˆ has a weak fine objection (Q , zˆ)
in ES . Let z be an extension of zˆ to an assignment in E . As Q ⊂ S , (Q , z) is
a weak fine counterobjection to (S , y) in E . But this contradicts our assumption
that (S , y) is a weak fine justified objection to x in E . 
Example 4.3. Consider an economy E in which the commodity space is ++,
and the set of traders is ([0, 3],B , µ), where B is the σ-field of Borel subsets
of [0, 3] and µ is the Lebesgue measure. The space of states of nature is Ω =
{ω1, ω2}. All traders have the same utility function, given for (ω, x ) ∈ Ω ×++
by
u(ω, x ) = ln x .
The initial assignment is e(t , ω) = 2, for all (t , ω) ∈ T ×Ω. Let T1 = [0, 1],T2 =
(1, 2], and T3 = (2, 3]. The information partition of a trader t ∈ T1 ∪ T2 is
Π1 = Π2 = {Ω} , and that of the traders t in T3 is Π3 = {{ω1}, {ω2}} . The
priors of the traders in T1, T2, and T3 are, respectively, q1 = ( 14 , 34 ), q2 = ( 34 , 14 ),
and q3 = ( 12 , 12 ). We construct a weak fine bargaining set allocation of E which
is not competitive in E ∗.
Define an assignment x : T ×Ω → ++ by
x(t , ω1) =


1 t ∈ T1
2.55 t ∈ T2
2.45 t ∈ T3,
and
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x(t , ω2) =


2.55 t ∈ T1
1 t ∈ T2
2.45 t ∈ T3.
Then x is a weak fine allocation in E . We show that x is in the weak fine
bargaining set of E , but it is not competitive in E ∗. Assume, by way of contra-
diction, that (S , y) is a justified weak fine objection to x in E . Then by Lemma
4.2 the restriction yˆ of y to S × Ω is a competitive allocation in E ∗S . Now if
µ(S ∩T3) = 0, then we must have that yˆ(t , ω) = e(t , ω) for all (t , ω) ∈ S ×Ω. As
ht (e(t , ·)) < ht (x(t , ·)) for all t ∈ T1 ∪ T2, this leads to a contradiction. Assume
that µ(S ∩ T3) > 0. Let p be a price system such that (p, yˆ) is a competitive
equilibrium of E ∗S . Then p(ω1) > 0 and p(ω2) > 0. Without loss of generality
assume that p(ω2) = 1, and denote r = p(ω1). Then the first order conditions for
utility maximization imply that for almost all t ∈ S ,
yˆ(t , ω1) =


1
2 (1 + 1r ) t ∈ T1
3
2 (1 + 1r ) t ∈ T2
1 + 1
r
t ∈ T3,
and
yˆ(t , ω2) =


3
2 (1 + r) t ∈ T1
1
2 (1 + r) t ∈ T2
1 + r t ∈ T3.
Since µ(S ) > 0 and (p, yˆ) is a competitive equilibrium of E ∗S , we have(
1 + 1
r
)
(1 + r) ≤ 163 < (2.45)
2 .
Therefore for almost all t ∈ S ∩ T3 we have
ht (y(t , ·)) = 12 ln
[(
1 + 1
r
)
(1 + r)
]
<
1
2
ln (2.45)2 = ht (x(t , ·)).
As µ(S ∩ T3) > 0, this contradicts the assumption that (S , y) is a weak fine
objection to x.
The above argument shows that if, in particular, z is a competitive allocation
of E ∗, then for almost all t ∈ T3
ht (z(t , ·)) < ht (x(t , ·)).
Therefore x is not a competitive allocation of E ∗. Note that the last inequality
implies that the informed traders (i.e., the traders in T3) are better off in x than
in any competitive allocation of E ∗.
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